English book · Islam and Peace

Chapter Sixteen

English book, p. 188

By Maulana Wahiduddin Khan

By 1956, Nehru had publicly offered a settlement of Kashmir with Pakistan over the ceasefire line (now converted into the Line of Control). On 23 May 1964, Nehru asked Sheikh Abdullah to meet Ayub Khan in Rawalpindi in an effort to solve the Kashmir imbroglio [...] the Pakistani leader agreed to a summit with Nehru, which was to be held in June 1964. This message was urgently telegraphed to Nehru on May 26. But just as Nehru’s consent reached Karachi, the world also learnt that Nehru had died in his sleep. And with that a major opportunity for a peaceful solution [of the] Kashmir [conflict] was also lost. If Pakistan were to accept the status quo in Kashmir as a permanent solution, it would not have any negative consequences at all for Pakistan, nor, in broader terms, for Muslims as a whole. In such a situation, despite being separate from Pakistan, Kashmir would still retain its status of a Muslim-majority region. Furthermore, it is an uncontestable fact that the Muslims who live in India are in a better position than the Muslims of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Another point to be noted is that for Pakistan to reconcile with India is no ordinary matter. If it does so, it would be able to end its on-going conflict with its powerful neighbour. To end a running conflict with a neighbour is tantamount to opening the doors to every kind of progress. How ending a conflict with an enemy paves the way for progress is illustrated by the example of modern Japan. During the Second World War, Japan and the USA were enemies, but after the war, Japan reconciled with America. This reconciliation enabled Japan to emerge as an economic super-power. Pakistan’s present policy has become the cause of Islam being given a bad name. In line with this policy, Pakistan had sought to make hatred against India a means of promoting national unity. But this wrong policy did not succeed in uniting the people of

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