II The Views of Bertrand Russell

The Views of Bertrand Russel has achieved is far less as compared to other sciences.”4 In spite of life-long effort, even Russell himself could not put forward a coherent philosophy. In the words of Professor Alan Wood: ‘Bertrand Russell is a philosopher without a philosophy.’ Logic and mathematics have together been considered a means of apprehending reality, but according to Russell: ‘Logic and mathematics ... are the alphabet of the book of nature, not the book itself.’5 Russell holds that knowledge is of two kinds: ‘knowledge of things and knowledge of truths.’6 Expressed differently, knowledge of things is the knowledge of sensible facts. But sensible facts alone are not all that there is to the matter. There are truths which are inherent in the nature of things but which cannot, in themselves, be perceived. The way to arrive at these truths is by inference based on sensible facts. To Russell, inference can be valid, but it must be scientific inference.7 Of things, which we learn by direct observation, with no recourse to inference, he says: “I have come to accept the facts of sense and the broad truths of science as things which the philosophers should take as data.” This data consists of our observed sensations: visual, auditory, tactile, etc. But he then goes on to say that our scientific ideas, or concepts about the universe are not knowable through our observed sensations. Rather, our knowledge of the world is the result of inference. He even adds: ‘People’s thoughts are in their heads.’8 After an extensive study, he came to the conclusion that much too much emphasis had been laid upon experience, and that, therefore, empiricism as a philosophy must be regarded as having important limitations (p. 191). He goes on to say: “I found that almost all philosophers had been mistaken as to what can and what cannot be inferred from experience alone.” (p. 194)