II The Views of Bertrand Russell

The Views of Bertrand Russel Russell’s views, which we have attempted to present here: It is not always realized how exceedingly abstract is the information that theoretical physics has to give. It lays down certain fundamental equations that enable it to deal with the logical structure of events, while leaving it completely unknown what is the intrinsic character of the events that have the structure. We only know the intrinsic character of events when they happen to us. Nothing whatever in theoretical physics enables us to say anything about the intrinsic character of events elsewhere. They may be just like the events that happen to us or they may be totally different in strictly unimaginable ways. All that physics gives us is certain equations giving abstract properties of their changes. But as to what it is that changes, and what it changes from and to—as to this, physics is silent.12 Russell concludes the chapter, “Non-Demonstrable Inference” with the caution that “— there is no such claim to certainty as has, too often and too uselessly, been made by rash philosophers.” (p. 207) When the accepted philosophical and scientific position is such that we can only observe external appearances without it being possible for us to learn the intrinsic character of things directly, there are only two ways open to us: either to take refuge in scepticism or to admit the truth of religion. Since research has shown that direct knowledge is impossible, it would appear that one must resign oneself to saying: “I do not know anything.” But Russell does not accept this position. He asserts that the inference which is based on external appearance regarding the intrinsic character of things is also valid. In so saying, he arrives close to the very frontiers of religion, which also holds that man, owing to his limited sense perceptions, cannot perceive reality in its full and final form. It is only from his observation of the visible things in the universe that he can infer the reality behind it. It is strange that a man as intelligent as Russell should reject scepticism just as he rejects religion. He forgets that by adopting such a position, he is guilty of contradicting his own standards.