Compromise and Foresight

Compromise and Foresight

1985 11 November 11-13 Compromise and Foresight (1188) When the prophet of Islam and his followers migrated from Mecca to Medina as a result of severe persecution by the Meccans, he was acknowledged by the Medinan converts as the head of the state. But, there was a sizeable proportion of prosperous Jews in Medina who were averse to the rapid spread of the new faith.

In order to avoid a confrontation with them which might lead to their new faith being nipped in the bud, the prophet entered into a treaty in which he accorded the Jewish religion equal status. The treaty specified Judaism for the Jews and Islam for the Muslims. The following were the words of the truce:

1. Muslims and Jews shall live as one people;

2. Each party shall keep to its own faith. Neither shall interfere with that of the other.

This appears rather strange: far from according equal status to other existing faiths, the mission of the prophet of Islam was to bring into predominance the religion which was being revealed to him.

But the prophet was very farseeing. He knew this was a temporary phase. To him, this was Islamic history in the making; even though preaching Islam meant a hard struggle, he felt certain it was going to prevail in the long run. In view of the great potential the future held, the prophet saw that, for the moment, there was wisdom in accepting an inferior position.

A similar situation occurred at the time the peace treaty at Hudaibiyya was being drafted. The prophet agreed to the inclusion of such articles as obviously amounted to acknowledging the superiority of non-Muslims. The parties agreed to maintain peace for ten years on the following conditions:

1. The Muslims should return that year without performing the pilgrimage;

2. Next year they should perform the pilgrimage, but must not stay more than three days at Mecca;

3. They must not take back with them any Muslims then living in Mecca, nor must they stand in the way of anyone of their own number who might wish to remain in Mecca;

4. They must surrender any Meccan going to settle in Medina, but if any of the Medinan Muslims should go to Mecca, the Meccans would not send him back to Medina; and lastly,

5. The Arab tribes will be free to make what alliances they would, with either party.

The prophet, who had been assigned the task of purging Mecca of the presence of all forms of polytheism, did allow himself to be relegated to an inferior position. The highly provocative treaty, considered by all the followers of the prophet as humiliating, could be concluded only because of the prophet’s foresight. He grasped the realities behind the words of the treaty. The prophet was willing to go to any length to de-fuse the existing tension. The state of war was to be ended at any cost. With peace in hand he could devote all his time to preaching and communicating the message of God to his servants. As a result, in the following year, on the occasion of pilgrimage there were ten thousand men with the Prophet instead of the fourteen hundred he had on the occasion of the truce. This increase in the number of Muslims was due to no other cause than the treaty which the Muslims had thought humiliating. The truce of Hudaibiyya, in fact, bridged the gulf that had yawned between Muslims and non-Muslims because of the existence of the state of warfare. Before long, Islam became so powerful that just a show of strength alone was sufficient to conquer Mecca – the city which the prophet had not been allowed to enter even as a pilgrim.

It is interesting to see the modern parallel in the actions of Mr. Jinnah. When it was a question of the form rule was to take in independent India, he advocated a weak centre,

“. . . a loose federation with the centre having limited powers, and residue powers resting with the states. On the other hand, the whole thrust of the nationalist politics of the Congress was in the direction of a strong centre, Jinnah could not have gone along with Congress leaders.”

Indian leaders could not see beyond the words and resolutions of political parties in order to grasp the historical realities which determine the future of a country.

An example of a positive political compromise is that of Hong Kong, a British crown colony, situated on the coast of China’s Kwangtung Province – China’s “South Gate” – at the mouth of the HSI Chiang Estuary.

It was acquired on a 99-year lease from China, which is due to expire in 1997, and the British government has recently agreed to hand over the country to China. The signing of the treaty followed lengthy negotiations over the past two years involving 24 sittings. Hong Kong will be set free, according to the joint declaration, on 1st of July 1984.

After it is returned to China, the country will retain its freedom of expression; of holding congregations; of calling strikes; of worship; travel and the like. British inhabitants will be entitled to Government jobs. Hong Kong dollar will remain valid although it will no longer bear the photograph of the Queen of England. Thus Hong Kong will become a special administrative region.

In this elaborate treaty it has also been agreed, interalia, that China will not be entitled to buy shares in Cathay Pacific Airlines, and that the administration in Hong Kong will be run by the Hong Kong people under a chief executive from China.

The colony will thus enjoy a high degree of autonomy. The socialist system and socialist politics shall not be practised – and Hong Kong’s previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain unchanged for fifty years. This is a compromise which will obviously benefit everyone concerned.

Let us now take another example which is exactly the opposite of this joint treaty, arrived at peacefully, by mutual agreement.

The Suez Canal in Egypt which connects the Mediterranean and the Red Seas was constructed in 1854-56 by the Suez Canal Company owned by the French. The company had received an Act of Concession from the Viceroy of Egypt, Said Pasha, giving it the right to operate a maritime canal for 99 years after completion of the work. In 1956, however, 13 years before the concession was due to expire, the canal was nationalized by President Jamal Abdul Nasser. The consequences were disastrous. The western powers avenged the attempt at nationalization not only by damaging the canal but also by attacking Egypt, involving themselves indirectly through Israel.

The Egyptians, while gaining an immediate economic advantage, soured relations with innumerable other countries and caused grave disruption in international trade. In the long run, Egypt cannot be said to have been the gainer from such a situation.

It should always be remembered, if we think of the prophet’s actions, that it is in no way wrong or demeaning to accept a workable and humane compromise when it is ultimately to bring much richer rewards. Religious priorities, like political expediency, must, before all else, be far-seeing.