Muhammad: The Prophet of Islam

Muhammad The Prophet of Islam

1985 11 November 22-24 Muhammad: The Prophet of Islam (1185) Of the many Arab tribes that embraced Islam after the conquest of Mecca in 8AH, most of them had converted, impressed by the political dominance of Islam, rather than from undergoing any profound intellectual transformation or attaining any such conviction as had driven the earlier followers of the prophet. They had been accustomed to a free and easy life, and some of the Islamic injunctions – especially Zakat* – were more than they could tolerate. Some months before the death of the prophet, demagogues arose in Yemen and Najd who exploited this situation and put forward a new brand of Islam, one in which there was no need to pay Zakat. To give their words more weight these demagogues – notably Aswad and Musailama – Iaid claim to prophethood, for only then could they throw down a challenge to the Zakat system. Zakat was part of the religion revealed to the prophet Mohammad; they themselves would have to pretend to prophethood in order to speak with the same authority. Their “prophethood” became very popular among the tribes who looked upon Zakat as a burden, and they flocked to these false prophets’ support. Their morale received a boost with the death of the prophet in 10 AH, and apostasy started spreading like wildfire, the only places remaining immune being Mecca, Medina and Taif. There were reports, too, that these rebels were preparing to attack Medina.

* a portion of property bestowed in alms.

One of the tasks that the Prophet performed during his last days was to arrange a force under Usama Ibn Zaid. This army was to attack the Romans on the Syrian front, where previously Usama’s father Zaid had met his death at the hands of the Romans at Mauta. They had just left Medina when news came of the Prophet’s death, so they pitched camp, awaiting orders from his successors. Much as the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, wanted the army to advance, most of the companions were against this. “The Arab tribes are in the throes of revolt,” they said “Medina is liable to be attacked at any time. The army should stay to defend Medina, rather than to be sent to a distant land.” But Abu Bakr was adamant: the army would continue its march on Syria.

All the leading companions were gathered outside Medina under Usama’s command. They had two things on their minds. One was the wisdom of sending an army so far from Medina when the city was under threat of attack. Another was the reservations they had about Usama’s leadership, for he was only seventeen years of age and, worse, was the son of a slave. How, they thought, could great companions of the prophet serve under him, a mere stripling? A seasoned warrior of the Quraish should be appointed in his place.

Umar, who had been with Usama’s army, returned to Medina to convey their message to Abu Bakr. The Caliph listened to what he had to say about the first matter, and replied: “Even if I am the only one remaining in Medina after the departure of the army, and I am left to be devoured by wild beasts, still I cannot recall an army that the Prophet himself has dispatched.” He dismissed the matter of Usama’s youth and rank with these words: “What, are the Muslims still proud and arrogant, as in the time of ignorance?” Saying this, he himself went on foot to send the army on its way under Usama’s command. With Usama aloft on his mount, the Caliph of the Muslims walked alongside, speaking with him on matters concerning the military campaign. Usama requested Abu Bakr to ride, or let him alight so that they could both walk, but Abu Bakr would agree to neither. He wanted to put an end to the Muslims’ misgivings about Usama’s leadership, and this was the most practical and effective way of doing it. Their reservations vanished on seeing the Caliph walking alongside Usama’s mount.

As news of the advance of Usama’s army spread around Arabia, opponents saw it as a sign of the Muslims’ confidence. They presumed that the Prophet’s followers must have considerable reserve strength to be able to send an army so far from Medina at such a critical time. They decided to await the outcome of the Syrian campaign before attacking the city: if the Muslims met defeat, then they would be sufficiently weakened for an offensive against their capital to be feasible.

Usama Ibn Zaid’s army was eminently successful against the Romans. The campaign, which lasted forty days, also proved that Usama was the most suitable person for this expedition. His father had been martyred fighting the Roman army at Mauta, and he was keen for revenge. A large number of captives and great quantities of booty went back with the Muslims to Medina. The rebels lost heart on seeing this, and their revolt was quelled with comparative ease.

So it was that Muslims achieved success on both fronts, simply by doing what the Prophet said.

In the year AH8, the Prophet sent a small squad under the command of Amr Ibn Al-As to the Syrian territory of Zatus Salasil. On reaching that place, Amr Ibn Al-As surveyed the situation. He was dismayed by the enemy’s strength, and contacted the Prophet for reinforcements. An additional 100-man force was recruited from the Muhajirs, including Abu Bakr and Umar. Abu Ubaida Ibn Jarrah was put in charge of this party, and they were immediately dispatched to join forces with Amr Ibn Al-As.

When Abu Ubaida Ibn Al-Jarrah reached his destination and joined up with the army of Amr Ibn Al-As, the question arose as to who should take charge of the combined force. Amr Ibn Al-As claimed that the right was his, since he had requested the Prophet for reinforcements and Abu Ubaida’s squad had only come in that capacity. But the Muhajirs with Abu Ubaida did not agree. “You can command your force,” they said to Amr Ibn Al-As, “and Abu Ubaida will command the Muhajirs.” Such a division was not to the liking of Amr Ibn Al-As. He insisted that the Muhajirs were just reinforcements, sent to augment his troops, and that he was their rightful leader. Then Abu Ubaida, hurt at such a state of affairs, spoke up, “I will have you know, Amr,” he said, “that the last thing the Prophet did was to make me promise that the two of us would act in unison, without disagreement. Assuredly, even if you do not follow me, I will follow you.” Abu Ubaida then handed over the command to Amr Ibn Al-As and agreed to serve under him.

If both men had remained adamant then the matter would never have been solved, and the force which had been sent to combat a powerful enemy would have been exhausted through infighting. Individual assertion of authority at times of disagreement is a source of weakness to the party as a whole, while one individual’s submission to the authority of another injects strength into the body of individuals of which he is a part.

(To be continued)